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Abstract
The theory of repeated games analyzes the long-term relationship of interacting players and mathematically
reveals the condition of how cooperation is achieved, which is not achieved in a one-shot game. In the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma (RPD) game with no errors, zero-determinant (ZD) strategies allow a player to unilaterally
set a linear relationship between the player’s own payoff and the opponent’s payoff regardless of the strategy
that the opponent implements. In contrast, unconditional strategies such as ALLD and ALLC also unilaterally
set a linear payoff relationship. Errors often happen between players in the real world. However, little is known
about the existence of such strategies in the RPD game with errors. Here, we analytically search for all strategies
that enforce a linear payoff relationship under observation errors in the RPD game. As a result, we found that,
even in the case with observation errors, the only strategy sets that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either
ZD strategies or unconditional strategies and that no other strategies can enforce it, which were numerically
confirmed.
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1 Introduction
The two-player repeated prisoner’s dilemma (RPD) game is a model for exploring the long-term relationships
of players, which mathematically reveals how cooperation and competition arise among competitive players [1].
In the one-shot PD game, defection is the only Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, cooperation is possible
in the RPD game because players can reward cooperating partners by cooperating in the future. Also, players
can punish defecting partners by defecting in the future. This mechanism is called direct reciprocity [2–4]
and makes it possible for players to mutually cooperate in the RPD game. In the context of the RPD game,
theoretical biologists are interested in which strategies win in evolving populations. This question falls into
the field of evolutionary games [5]. A series of the results of evolutionary games in the RPD game brought
promising findings. Especially, with noise, generous tit-for-tat [6] and win-stay lose-shift [7, 8] were robust to
various kinds of evolutionary opponents. In this way, theoretical biologists have traditionally focused on strong
strategies obtained from evolutionary consequences. However, we can ask a question from a different point of
view: Are there any strategies which always win against the opponent irrespective of the opponent’s strategy?
Answering this question fosters greater understanding of the RPD game.
In 2012, Press and Dyson suddenly answered this question by finding a novel class of strategies which
contain such ultimate strategies, called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies [9]. ZD strategies impose a linear
relationship between the payoffs for a focal player and his opponent regardless of the strategy that the opponent
implements. The discovery of ZD strategies inspired various relevant studies, including their evolution [10–25],
multiplayer games [19, 26–29], continuous action spaces [28–31], alternating games [31], animal contests [32],
human reactions to computerized ZD strategies [33, 34], and human-human experiments [28, 35, 36], which
promote an understanding of the nature of human cooperation. For further understanding, see the recent elegant
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classification of strategies, partners (called “good strategies” in Ref. [11,37]) and rivals, in direct reciprocity [38].
In contrast, unconditional strategies such as ALLC and ALLD can also unilaterally set a linear payoff relationship
against the opponent [14, 39]. A previous study revealed that those two types of strategies are the only sets
which enforce a linear payoff relationship in the RPD game [39].
These two types of strategies were found in the case of no errors. Errors (or noise) are unavoidable in
human interactions and they may lead to the collapse of cooperation due to negative effects. Thus, the effect
of errors has been considered in the literature of the RPD game [40–48]. However, except for [49], the effect
of errors has not been considered for strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship. There are typically
two types of errors: perception errors [42] and implementation errors [43]. Hao et al. considered the former
case of the errors where players may misunderstand their opponent’s action because the players can only rely
on their private monitoring [40,44] instead of their opponent’s direct action. They remarkably showed that ZD
strategies can exist even in the case that such observation errors are incorporated [49]. In their model, they
mathematically searched for one of the cases where determinants become zero in line with Press and Dyson’s
formalism [9]. More specifically, they only searched for the case where the second and fourth columns of the
determinant take the same value as Press and Dyson did in the case of no errors. They did not consider other
possible strategies that make the determinant zero in the case of errors. In this study, from all possibilities,
we mathematically searched for all of the cases where the determinant becomes zero. As a result, we found
that only ZD strategies [9] and unconditional strategies [14, 39] are the two types which enforce a linear payoff
relationship and that no other strategies exist to make the determinant zero. We also confirmed this result by
numerical calculations.
2 Model
We consider the symmetric two-person RPD game with observation errors in line with the previous studies
[44, 49]. Each player i ∈ {X,Y } chooses an action ai ∈ {C,D}. Each player cannot see what action the
opponent chose. Instead, they can only observe a signal ωi ∈ {g, b}, where g and b denote good and bad
signals, respectively. The signal cannot be observed by the other player, meaning that the signal is private
information. Each player’s signal ωi basically depends on the opponent’s action but is also affected by noise
from the environment, which is a stochastic variable. In other words, a player observes g (or b) when the other
player chooses an action C (or D). However, when an error occurs, a player observes b (or g) although the other
player chooses an action C (or D) due to observation errors. We define σ(ω|a) as the probability that a signal
profile ω = (ωX , ωY ) is realized, given that an action profile a = (aX , aY ) occurs. Let  be the probability that
an error happens to one particular player but not to the other and ξ be the probability that an error happens to
both players. Then, the probability that an error occurs to neither player is 1−2− ξ. For example, when both
players choose action C, we have σ(g, g|C,C) = 1− 2− ξ, σ(b, g|C,C) = σ(g , b|C,C) = , and σ(b, b|C,C) = ξ.
The realized payoff for each player depends only on the action he chose and the signal he received, which is
denoted by ui(ai, ωi). Let ui(C, g), ui(C, b), ui(D, g), and ui(D, b) be R,S, T , and P , respectively. Then the
payoff matrix is given by ( g b
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
The entries represent the payoffs that a focal player gains in a single round of the repeated game. Each row
and column represents the action that the focal player chose and the signal he observed, respectively. In each
stage, player i’s expected payoff value over all possible signals, when two players have an action profile a, is
represented by
fi(a) =
∑
ω
ui(ai, ωi)σ(ω|a). (2)
The expected payoffs under different action profiles (C,C),(C,D),(D,C), and (D,D) are denoted by RE , SE , TE
and PE , respectively. According to Eq. (2), RE , SE , TE , and PE are derived as RE = R(1− − ξ) + S(+ ξ),
SE = S(1 −  − ξ) + R( + ξ), TE = T (1 −  − ξ) + P ( + ξ), PE = P (1 −  − ξ) + T ( + ξ), respectively. We
assume that
TE > RE > PE > SE , (3)
which dictates the prisoner’s dilemma condition. Both players expect a larger payoff by selecting D rather than
C irrespective of the other’s action because TE > RE and PE > SE hold. We also assume that
2RE > TE + SE , (4)
2
which guarantees that mutual cooperation is more beneficial than the two players alternating C and D in the
opposite phase, i.e., CD, DC, CD, DC, . . ., where the first and second letter represent the actions selected by
X and Y , respectively. The two players repeat the game whose payoff matrix in each round is given by Eq. (1).
Consider two players X and Y that adopt memory-one strategies, with which they use only the outcomes of
the last round to decide the action to be submitted in the current round. Even in the case of memory-n strategies,
errors can be considered. In fact, Hilbe et al. incorporated implementation errors in such a situation [48]. A
memory-one strategy is specified by a 4-tuple; X’s strategy is given by a combination of
p = (p1, p2, p3, p4), (5)
where 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3, p4 ≤ 1. The subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of p mean previous outcome Cg, Cb, Dg and Db,
respectively. In Eq. (5), p1 is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X cooperated and observed
signal g in the last round, p2 is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X cooperated and observed
signal b in the last round, p3 is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X defected and observed
signal g in the last round, and p4 is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X defected and observed
signal b in the last round. Note that, in this model, p depends on X’s action and its private observation in the
last round [44,49]. Contrary, p depends on X’s and Y ’s direct actions in the last round in the case of no errors.
Similarly, Y ’s strategy is specified by a combination of
q = (q1, q2, q3, q4), (6)
where 0 ≤ q1, q2, q3, q4 ≤ 1. Because both players adopt a memory-one strategy, the stochastic state of the two
players in round t is described by v(t) = (v1(t), v2(t), v3(t), v4(t)), where the subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of v mean
the stochastic state (C,C), (C,D), (D,C), and (D,D), respectively. v1(t) is the probability that both players
cooperate in round t, v2(t) is the probability that X cooperates and Y defects in round t, and so forth. The
state transition matrix M of this noisy repeated game is given by
M =


τp1q1
+p1q2
+p2q1
+ξp2q2


τp1(1− q1)
+p1(1− q2)
+p2(1− q1)
+ξp2(1− q2)


τ(1− p1)q1
+(1− p1)q2
+(1− p2)q1
+ξ(1− p2)q2


τ(1− p1)(1− q1)
+(1− p1)(1− q2)
+(1− p2)(1− q1)
+ξ(1− p2)(1− q2)

p1q3
+ξp1q4
+τp2q3
+p2q4


p1(1− q3)
+ξp1(1− q4)
+τp2(1− q3)
+p2(1− q4)


(1− p1)q3
+ξ(1− p1)q4
+τ(1− p2)q3
+(1− p2)q4


(1− p1)(1− q3)
+ξ(1− p1)(1− q4)
+τ(1− p2)(1− q3)
+(1− p2)(1− q4)

p3q1
+τp3q2
+ξp4q1
+p4q2


p3(1− q1)
+τp3(1− q2)
+ξp4(1− q1)
+p4(1− q2)


(1− p3)q1
+τ(1− p3)q2
+ξ(1− p4)q1
+(1− p4)q2


(1− p3)(1− q1)
+τ(1− p3)(1− q2)
+ξ(1− p4)(1− q1)
+(1− p4)(1− q2)

ξp3q3
+p3q4
+p4q3
+τp4q4


ξp3(1− q3)
+p3(1− q4)
+p4(1− q3)
+τp4(1− q4)


ξ(1− p3)q3
+(1− p3)q4
+(1− p4)q3
+τ(1− p4)q4


ξ(1− p3)(1− q3)
+(1− p3)(1− q4)
+(1− p4)(1− q3)
+τ(1− p4)(1− q4)


, (7)
where τ = 1− 2− ξ. Each row and column represents the previous states and the following states of the game,
respectively. Then, the stochastic state of the two players in round t+ 1 is calculated by v(t+ 1) = v(t)M . The
stationary distribution for M is a vector v such that
v = vM. (8)
Eq. (8) and M ′ ≡M − I yield
vM ′ = 0. (9)
Applying Cramer’s rule to matrix M ′, we obtain
Adj(M ′)M ′ = 0, (10)
where Adj(M ′) is the adjugate matrix of M ′. Here, Eqs. (9) and (10) imply that every row of Adj(M ′) is
proportional to v. Therefore, v is solely represented by the components of matrix M ′. Choosing the fourth
row of the matrix Adj(M ′), we see that v is composed of the determinant of the 3 × 3 matrixes formed from
the first three columns of M ′. We add the first column of M ′ into the second and third columns. Even by this
manipulation, this determinant is unchanged. The result of these manipulations is a formula for the dot product
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of an arbitrary vector f = (f1, f2, f3, f4) with the stationary distribution vector v, which can be represented by
the form of the determinant
v · f =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τp1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + ξp2q2 − 1 µp1 + ηp2 − 1 µq1 + ηq2 − 1 f1
p1q3 + ξp1q4 + τp2q3 + p2q4 ηp1 + µp2 − 1 µq3 + ηq4 f2
p3q1 + τp3q2 + ξp4q1 + p4q2 µp3 + ηp4 ηq1 + µq2 − 1 f3
ξp3q3 + p3q4 + p4q3 + τp4q4 ηp3 + µp4 ηq3 + µq4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≡ D(p, q,f), (11)
where µ = 1 −  − ξ and η =  + ξ. If we replace the arbitrary vector f with X’s expected payoff vector
SX = (RE , SE , TE , PE), we obtain v · SX . Then, we divide it by v · 1. Finally, we can obtain player X’s
per-round expected payoff in the form of the determinant as follows:
sX =
v · SX
v · 1 =
D(p, q,SX)
D(p, q,1)
, (12)
where 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1) is needed for the normalization. Similarly, player Y ’s per-round payoff can be represented
by the form of the determinant
sY =
v · SY
v · 1 =
D(p, q,SY )
D(p, q,1)
, (13)
where SY is Y ’s expected payoff vector (RE , TE , SE , PE). Hereafter, we only consider the relationship between
those two expected payoffs because they converge to certain expected values, respectively, if the stationary
distributions exist in infinitely repeated games. In contrast, other types of the payoff are worth investigating in
finitely repeated games.
Moreover, we can consider the linear combination of sX and sY , which can be given by the form of the
determinant
αsX + βsY + γ =
D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1)
D(p, q,1)
, (14)
where α, β, and γ, are arbitrary constant. The numerator of the right side of Eq. (14) is expressed in the
following:
D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1) =∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τp1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + ξp2q2 − 1 µp1 + ηp2 − 1 µq1 + ηq2 − 1 αRE + βRE + γ
p1q3 + ξp1q4 + τp2q3 + p2q4 ηp1 + µp2 − 1 µq3 + ηq4 αSE + βTE + γ
p3q1 + τp3q2 + ξp4q1 + p4q2 µp3 + ηp4 ηq1 + µq2 − 1 αTE + βSE + γ
ξp3q3 + p3q4 + p4q3 + τp4q4 ηp3 + µp4 ηq3 + µq4 αPE + βPE + γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(15)
If Eq. (15) is zero, the relationship between the two players’ payoffs becomes linear. In the next section, we
search for all of the solutions which satisfy this condition.
3 Result
We search for strategies that impose a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs regardless of their
opponent’s strategies in the RPD game with observation errors, which satisfy the following equation:
αsX + βsY + γ = 0. (16)
If the numerator of the right side of Eq. (14) is zero, Eq. (16) holds. In other words, if D(p, q, αSX+βSY +γ1) =
0 is satisfied, there is a linear payoff relationship between the two players’ payoffs.
Press and Dyson (without error) [9] and Hao et al. (with error) [49] only searched for the case that the
second and fourth columns take the same value. This makes the determinant become zero. Here, from all
possibilities, we search for all of the cases (including this case) that D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1) = 0 holds. The
following determinant theorem gives such a condition.
Theorem 1 For an n× n matrix A, the following holds:
det(A) = 0 ⇔ The columns of matrix A are linearly dependent vectors.
We define ai (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) as i-th column vector of the determinant of Eq. (15). From the above theorem, if
the columns of the determinant of Eq. (15) are linearly dependent vectors, there exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β,
and γ, except for the trivial solution ((s, t, u, v) = (0, 0, 0, 0),(α, β, γ) = (0, 0, 0)), such that
sa1 + ta2 + ua3 + va4 = 0, (17)
where vector 0 denotes a zero vector.
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3.1 Without errors (perfect monitoring)
3.1.1 Mathematical analysis
In this section, we search for all of the strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship without errors
( = 0 and ξ = 0). When there are no errors, the expected payoffs correspond to the original payoffs, i.e.,
SX = (RE , SE , TE , PE) = (R,S, T, P ) and SY = (RE , TE , SE , PE) = (R, T, S, P ), respectively. In addition, by
substituting  = 0 and ξ = 0 into Eq. (15), we obtain
D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p1q1 − 1 p1 − 1 q1 − 1 αR+ βR+ γ
p2q3 p2 − 1 q3 αS + βT + γ
p3q2 p3 q2 − 1 αT + βS + γ
p4q4 p4 q4 αP + βP + γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (18)
which is the same with Press and Dyson’s determinant [9]. By the extensive calculations provided in Appendix
A, we found the only strategies that impose a linear payoff relationship between the two players’ payoffs are
either
p1 − 1 = αR+ βR+ γ
p2 − 1 = αS + βT + γ
p3 = αT + βS + γ
p4 = αP + βP + γ,
(19)
or
p1 = p2 = p3 = p4. (20)
Equation (19) corresponds to ZD strategies without error ( [9], Eq. (1) of [14], Eq. (1) of [13], and Eq. (3)
of [38]). Equation (20) is called unconditional strategies [14]. Only these strategy sets p can impose a linear
relationship and no other strategies can impose it.
To conclude, in the RPD game under perfect monitoring, we showed that either ZD strategies or uncondi-
tional strategies can impose a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs. This is consistent with the
previous result in the case with a discount factor but no errors [39].
3.1.2 Numerical examples
We show numerical examples that ZD strategies and unconditional strategies can impose a linear relationship
between the two players’ payoffs while others cannot in the RPD game without errors. Figure 1 shows the
relationship between the two players’ expected payoffs per game with payoff vector (T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5).
The gray quadrangle in each panel represents the feasible set of the payoffs. We fixed one particular strategy
for player X (vertical line) and randomly generate 1,000 strategies that satisfy 0 ≤ q1, q2, q3, q4 ≤ 1 for player
Y (horizontal axis). Thus, each black dot represents the payoff relationship between two players. In addition,
the blue and red are the particular cases for player Y . Red is the case that player Y is ALLD and blue is the
case that player Y is ALLC.
Figure 1A shows the case with a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. As WSLS
strategies are neither ZD nor unconditional strategies, the payoff relationships are not linear.
Numerical examples of ZD strategies
Equalizer [9], Extortioner [9], and Generous strategies [23] are known as the three most prominent ZD strate-
gies. Here, we take up the first two as the numerical examples of ZD although Generous strategies play an
important role in the evolution of cooperation. In contrast to Extortion, Generous strategies always obtain
lower payoffs than the opponent except for mutual cooperation. Hence, Generous strategies are known as one of
the cooperative ZD strategies. Because Extortion never loses in a one-to-one competition, Extortion is feasible
in a small population. However, in a large evolving population, cooperative groups are more successful than the
group of Extortioners. Thus, evolution leads from Extortion to Generous strategies [23]. In this sense, Generous
strategies are important. Figure 1B is the case with an Extortioner strategy vs. 1000+2 strategies. Extortioner
strategies are the subset of ZD strategies [9] (See Box 1 in [38] for a clear explanation of Extortioner (extor-
tionate) strategies). Extortioner strategies can always gain a higher payoff than the one’s opponent, except for
the point (P, P ), regardless of the opponent’s strategies. When we set (α, β, γ) = (0.01,−0.15, 0) in Eq. (19),
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Figure 1: The payoff relationships between two players in the RPD game without errors. Payoff vector:
(T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5). (A) WSLS strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (B) Extortioner strategy vs. 1000 + 2
strategies. (C) Equalizer strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (D) TFT strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (E) ALLC
vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (F) ALLD vs. 1000 + 2 strategies.
we obtain an Extortioner strategy, p = (0.86, 0.77, 0.09, 0), with 0.01sX − 0.15sY = 0. In this particular case,
the Extortioner strategy (player X) gains the payoff fifteen times higher than player Y .
Figure 1C is the case with an Equalizer strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. Note that, only in this case, the
vertical and horizontal axes are reversed. Thus, the horizontal axis is the payoff of Equalizer (player X) and
the vertical axis is the payoff of player Y . Equalizer strategies are also the subset of ZD strategies [9]. If
a player uses Equalizer strategies, he can fix the opponent’s payoff to be one particular value. When we set
(α, β, γ) = (0,−2/3, 1/3) in Eq. (19), we obtain an Equalizer strategy, p = (2/3, 1/3, 2/3, 1/3), which can fix
the opponent’s payoff at sY = 0.5 irrespective of the opponent’s strategies.
Figure 1D is the case with TFT p = (1, 0, 1, 0) strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. When we set (α, β, γ) =
(0.5,−0.5, 0) in Eq. (19), we obtain TFT p = (1, 0, 1, 0), which means that TFT is also the subset of ZD
strategies. Actually, TFT is a special case of ZD strategies with sX = sY called “fair strategies” [26]. Moreover,
the strategies that p1 = 1, p4 = 0, p2 +p3 = 1 including TFT can impose the linear payoff relationship sX = sY .
See Appendix B for the proof.
Numerical examples of unconditional strategies
Figure 1E is the case with ALLC vs. 1000+2 strategies. ALLC is one of the examples of unconditional strategies
(r, r, r, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 where r = 1. If we substitute r = 1 and (T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5) into Eq. (34), we
obtain (β, γ) = (3α,−4α) and we have a straight line represented by sX + 3sY − 4 = 0. We numerically see
that the payoff of ALLC is always lower than the opponent’s payoff except for (R,R).
Figure 1F is the case with ALLD vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. ALLD is also one of the examples of unconditional
strategies (r, r, r, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 where r = 0. If we substitute r = 0 and (T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5) into
Eq. (34), we obtain (β, γ) = (3α, 0) and we have a straight line represented by sX + 3sY = 0. We numerically
see that the payoff of ALLD is always higher than the opponent’s payoff except for (P, P ). Unlike ZD strategies,
the slopes of the straight lines in Figure 1E and 1F are always negative [14].
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3.2 With observation errors (imperfect monitoring)
3.2.1 Mathematical analysis
In the same way as no errors, we search for strategies that impose a linear relationship between the two players’
payoffs regardless of the opponent’s strategy in the RPD game with observation errors. If the numerator of the
right side of Eq. (14) is zero, the following equation holds:
αsX + βsY + γ = 0. (21)
In other words, if D(p, q, αSX +βSY + γ1) = 0 is satisfied, there is a linear payoff relationship between the
two players’ payoffs. By the extensive calculations provided in Appendix C, we found the only strategies that
impose a linear payoff relationship between the two players’ payoffs are either
µp1 + ηp2 − 1 = αRE + βRE + γ
ηp1 + µp2 − 1 = αSE + βTE + γ
µp3 + ηp4 = αTE + βSE + γ
ηp3 + µp4 = αPE + βPE + γ,
(22)
or
p1 = p2 = p3 = p4. (23)
Equation (22) is ZD strategies with observation errors. This is consistent with Hao et al.’s [49]. Equation
(23) is unconditional strategies. Moreover, we analytically show the feasible payoff range for unconditional
strategies. See Appendix D.
In summary, in the RPD game even with observation errors (imperfect monitoring), we showed that either
ZD strategies or unconditional strategies can impose a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs and
that no other strategies can impose it. This is a new fact discovered in this study.
3.2.2 Numerical examples
As well as the case without errors, we show numerical examples that ZD strategies and unconditional strategies
can impose a linear relationship between the two players’ payoffs while others cannot in the RPD game with
errors. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the two players’ expected payoffs per game with payoff vector
(T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5). The gray quadrangle in each panel represents the feasible payoff set. As error
rates are increased, the size of the feasible payoff set becomes smaller. We fixed one particular strategy for player
X (vertical line) and randomly generate 1,000 strategies that satisfy 0 ≤ q1, q2, q3, q4 ≤ 1 for player Y (horizontal
axis). Each black dot represents the payoff relationship between two players without errors (+ξ = 0), the same
as Figure 1. Moreover, green, light green, and light blue dots correspond to the cases of  + ξ = 0.1, 0.2, and
0.3, respectively. We do not consider the case of + ξ ≥ 1/3 because it does not satisfy the prisoner’s dilemma
condition: TE > RE > PE > SE . As in the case with no errors, red is the case that player Y is ALLD and blue
is the case that player Y is ALLC.
Figure 2A shows the case with a Win-Stay-Lose-Shift (WSLS) strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. In this case,
ξ = 0 is fixed and  is varied to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. As in the case with no errors, the payoff relationships are not
linear in this case because WSLS strategies are neither ZD nor unconditional strategies.
Numerical examples of ZD strategies
Figure 2B is the case with an Extortioner strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. As shown in Figure 1, p =
(0.86, 0.77, 0.09, 0) (black dots) is the extortion strategy without errors. In this case, player X can always
gain a higher payoff than the opponent (with the slope of 15), except for the point (P, P ), regardless of the op-
ponent’s strategies. p = (0.926875, 0.818125, 0.111875, 0.003125) (green) and p = (1, 0.86, 0.14, 0) (light green)
are the extortion strategies when  + ξ = 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. Unlike Extortioner without errors, there
exists the region that the expected payoff of the Extortioner with errors is lower than the opponent’s payoff
near (PE , PE).
Hao et al. already proved this fact [49]. They call it dominant extortion when the expected payoff of a
focal player is always higher than the opponent except for (P, P ). This is only possible when there are no
errors. When there are errors, only contingent extortion can exist as Hao et al. proved. We assume that player
X adopts the contingent extortion. The contingent extortion implies that when player Y tries to increase his
payoff, he will increase X’s payoff even more. However, in some regions near (PE , PE), X’s payoff is lower than
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Figure 2: The payoff relationships between two players in the RPD game with errors. Payoff vector:
(T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5). (A) WSLS strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (B) Extortioner strategy vs. 1000 + 2
strategies. (C) Equalizer strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (D) TFT strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (E) ALLC
vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. (F) ALLD vs. 1000 + 2 strategies.
Y ’s payoff. We mathematically restate the difference between dominant and contingent based on Hao et al.’s
formalism [49]. We transform α = φs′, β = −φ, γ = φ(1 − s′)l in Eq. (22) in line with Hilbe’s formalism [14].
We determine l, s′ so that l = PE + ∆1/s′ > 1 are satisfied where 1/s′ is the slope of the line. Note that the
inverse of s′ is considered as the slope because, in Hilbe’s formalism, s′ is the coefficient for player Y while
in our and Hao’s formalism s′ is the coefficient for player X. Also, φ,∆ must satisfy 0 ≤ p1, p2, p3, p4 ≤ 1.
When  + ξ = 0 (no error), if we set (s′, φ,∆) = (1/15, 0.15, 0), we obtain l = PE in Eq. (22) and p becomes
p = (0.86, 0.77, 0.09, 0) (black dots in Figure 2B). In this case, the payoff of player X is always higher than player
Y except for the point (P, P ). However, when +ξ > 0, there is no solution in Eq. (22) when ∆ = 0. Thus, ∆ > 0
is needed, which means that there are the cases that the payoff of player X is lower than that of player Y . For
instance, when + ξ = 0.1, 0.2 are given, if we set (s′, φ,∆) = (1/15, 0.15, 0.1) and (s′, φ,∆) = (1/15, 0.15, 0.2),
p = (0.926875, 0.818125, 0.111875, 0.003125) (green in Figure 2B) p = (1, 0.86, 0.14, 0) (light green in Figure 2B)
are obtained. In those cases, X’s payoff is lower than Y ’s payoff near (PE , PE) although Y ’s increase leads to
X’s increase even more.
Figure 2C is the case with an Equalizer strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. Note that, only in this case,
the vertical and horizontal axes are reversed. Thus, the horizontal axis is the payoff of Equalizer (player X)
and the vertical axis is the payoff of player Y . As Hao et al. already suggested [49], there exist Equalizer
strategies even if errors are incorporated. When  + ξ = 0 (no error), if we set (α, β, γ) = (0,−2/3, 1/3)
in Eq. (22), we obtain an Equalizer strategy, p = (2/3, 1/3, 2/3, 1/3), which can fix the opponent payoff at
sY = 0.5 irrespective of the opponent’s strategies as shown by black dots in Figure 2C. When  + ξ = 0.1, if
we set (α, β, γ) = (0,−0.695653, 0.347827), we obtain an Equalizer strategy, p = (0.8, 0.365217, 0.634783, 0.2)
which can fix the opponent payoff at sY = 0.5 as shown by green dots in Figure 2C. Also, when + ξ = 0.2, if
we set (α, β, γ) = (0,−0.3, 0.15), we obtain an Equalizer strategy, p = (0.99, 0.74, 0.26, 0.01) which can fix the
opponent payoff at sY = 0.5 as shown by light green dots in Figure 2C. As error rates are increased, the payoff
range for Equalizer becomes smaller.
Figure 2D is the case with TFT p = (1, 0, 1, 0) strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. When + ξ = 0 (no error),
if we set p = (1, 0, 1, 0) in Eq. (22), we obtain (α, β, γ) = (0.5,−0.5, 0), which means that sX = sY (black dots)
in the case of TFT. When  + ξ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, if we set p = (1, 0, 1, 0) in Eq. (22), we obtain (α, β, γ) =
(0.386555,−0.672269, 0.142857), (α, β, γ) = (0.0714286,−1.07143, 0.5), and (α, β, γ) = (−2.36364,−3.63636, 3),
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respectively. Thus, we obtain the corresponding lines, (α, β, γ) = (0.386555,−0.672269, 0.142857) (green),
(α, β, γ) = (0.0714286,−1.07143, 0.5) (light green), and (α, β, γ) = (−2.36364,−3.63636, 3) (light blue), respec-
tively. When there are no errors, sX = sY always holds. However, there are errors, this does not hold any
more. As error rates are increased, the difference between sX and sY becomes larger. In general, when there are
errors, unlike when there are no errors, TFT does not enforce a linear payoff relationship. Only when special
payoff matrices are given, the linear payoff relationship remains. See Appendix E in detail.
Numerical examples of unconditional strategies
Figure 2E is the case with ALLC vs. 1000+2 strategies. ALLC is one of the examples of unconditional strategies
(r, r, r, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 where r = 1. When  + ξ = 0 (no error), by Eq. (51), we obtain (β, γ) = (3α,−4α).
Thus, the equation of the straight line is sX + 3sY − 4 = 0 (black dots in Figure 2E) and the domain of sX
becomes −0.5 ≤ sX ≤ 1 from Eq. (62). When  + ξ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, we obtain the corresponding lines,
sX + 2.4sY − 2.89 = 0 (−0.35 ≤ sX ≤ 0.85) (green)sX + 1.8sY − 1.96 = 0 (−0.2 ≤ sX ≤ 0.7) (light green)and
sX + 1.2sY − 1.21 = 0 (−0.05 ≤ sX ≤ 0.55) (light blue), respectively. We numerically see that the payoff of
ALLC is always lower than the opponent’s payoff except for (RE , RE) and all the dots are on the feasible lines
(RE , RE)− (TE , SE), respectively.
Figure 2F is the case with ALLD vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. ALLD is also one of the examples of unconditional
strategies (r, r, r, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 where r = 0. When + ξ = 0 (no error), by Eq. (51), we obtain (β, γ) = (3α, 0).
Thus, the equation of the straight line is sX + 3sY = 0 (black dots in Figure 2F) and the domain of sX
becomes 0 ≤ sX ≤ 1.5 from Eq. (62). When  + ξ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, we obtain the corresponding lines,
sX + 2.4sY − 0.51 = 0 (0.15 ≤ sX ≤ 1.35) (green)sX + 1.8sY − 0.84 = 0 (0.3 ≤ sX ≤ 1.2) (light green)and
sX + 1.2sY − 0.99 = 0 (0.45 ≤ sX ≤ 1.05) (light blue), respectively. We numerically see that the payoff of
ALLD is always higher than the opponent’s payoff except for (PE , PE) and all the dots are on the feasible lines
(SE , TE)− (PE , PE), respectively.
4 Conclusions
We analyzed strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in the RPD game. Press
and Dyson firstly developed a new mathematical formalism for the expected payoffs of two players and found
that if the second and fourth columns of the specific determinant take the same value, the determinant becomes
zero, which implies the two players’ expected payoffs become linear [9]. Hao et al. used the same linear algebra
technique and extended it to the case with observation errors [49]. Here, not just the case where the second
and fourth columns of the determinant take the same value, we searched for all of the strategies which make
the determinant zero under observation errors. As a result, we found that the only strategy sets that enforce
a linear payoff relationship are either ZD strategies or unconditional strategies, which was consistent with the
case of the RPD game with a discount factor [39]. We confirmed that the solutions are correct by showing some
numerical calculations.
Press and Dyson first discovered strategies that make the determinant for the expected payoffs zero by finding
that the second and fourth columns of the determinant take the same value [9]. They call these strategies “zero-
determinant strategies” (original ZD strategies) and all subsequent studies also call them “zero-determinant
strategies.” By searching for all possibilities, we found that not only these original ZD strategies but also
unconditional strategies make the determinant zero with a different form and that no other strategies exist to
make the determinant zero. In this sense, strictly speaking, both the original ZD strategies and unconditional
strategies may be called “zero-determinant strategies.”
The original ZD strategies and the unconditional strategies are the only sets which impose a linear payoff
relationship irrespective of the opponent strategies, not only in the case with a discount factor [39] but also
in the case with observation errors as shown here. This result suggests that, in any case, those two sets are
the only types of strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship between two players. To investigate the
inference, one possible direction of future research is analyzing the case of the RPD game with a discount factor
under observation errors.
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Appendix A Detailed calculations without errors
We substitute the column vectors of the determinant of Eq. (18) into Eq. (17) to obtain
s

p1q1 − 1
p2q3
p3q2
p4q4
+ t

p1 − 1
p2 − 1
p3
p4
+ u

q1 − 1
q3
q2 − 1
q4
+ v

αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0. (24)
By taking out q in Eq. (24), we obtain
(sp1 + u)q1
(sp2 + u)q3
(sp3 + u)q2
(sp4 + u)q4
+ t

p1 − 1
p2 − 1
p3
p4
+

−u− s
0
−u
0
+ v

αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0. (25)
Here, we search for strategies which satisfy D(p, q, αSX +βSY +γ1) = 0 irrespective of Y ’s strategy q, meaning
that Eq. (25) must hold true irrespective of q. Therefore, the coefficients of each element q in Eq. (25) must
equal to zero, that is, the following conditions are necessary:
sp1 + u = 0
sp2 + u = 0
sp3 + u = 0
sp4 + u = 0.
(26)
When Eq. (26) holds, the first terms of Eq. (25) are eliminated and we obtain
t

p1 − 1
p2 − 1
p3
p4
+

−u− s
0
−u
0
+ v

αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0. (27)
If there exist real numbers, s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ such that Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) are satisfied simultaneously,
D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1) = 0 holds irrespective of q. To solve Eq. (26), we subtract the fourth equation from
the first three in Eq. (26): 
s(p1 − p4) = 0
s(p2 − p4) = 0
s(p3 − p4) = 0
sp4 + u = 0.
(28)
Then, we obtain s = 0 or p1 = p4 from the first equation. First, in the case that s = 0 holds, the second and
third equations automatically hold and we obtain u = 0 from the fourth. Hence, we obtain s = 0 and u = 0.
Second, in the cases that s 6= 0 and p1 = p4 hold, we obtain p2 = p4 and p3 = p4 and p4 = −u/s from the
second, third and fourth equations, respectively. Therefore, the solutions of Eq. (26) are either (1) s = 0 and
u = 0 or (2) p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = −u/s. Next, we check that these solutions can also satisfy Eq. (27) in the
following.
Case (1) s = 0 and u = 0:
In this case, we substitute s = 0 and u = 0 into Eq. (27) to obtain
t

p1 − 1
p2 − 1
p3
p4
+ v

αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0. (29)
Here, when we set t = 0, either equation
v = 0 (30)
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or 
αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0 (31)
must hold. When we set v = 0, we obtain the trivial solution (s, t, u, v) = (0, 0, 0, 0). Also, we solve Eq. (31) and
obtain the trivial solution (α, β, γ) = (0, 0, 0). Hence, we do not have to consider the case of t = 0. Therefore,
in the following, we only consider t 6= 0. Replacing constants −αv/t, −βv/t, and −γv/t with α, β, and γ, we
obtain,
p1 − 1 = αR+ βR+ γ
p2 − 1 = αS + βT + γ
p3 = αT + βS + γ
p4 = αP + βP + γ.
(32)
If there exist α, β, and γ for p satisfying Eq. (32), there must be solutions that Eq. (17) hold. This strategy set
p can impose a linear relationship. Eq. (32) corresponds to ZD strategies without error ( [9], Eq. (1) of [14],
Eq. (1) of [13], and Eq. (3) of [38]).
Case (2) p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = −u/s:
In this case, let r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) be −u/s , we substitute p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = r and u = −sr into Eq. (27) to
obtain
t

r − 1
r − 1
r
r
+ s

r − 1
0
r
0
+ v

αR+ βR+ γ
αS + βT + γ
αT + βS + γ
αP + βP + γ
 = 0. (33)
There exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ which satisfies Eq. (33) as follows:
s =
vα(S(−P −R+ S) + T (P +R− T ))
(1− r)(P − S) + r(T −R)
t =
vα(S(2P − S + r(−P −R+ S)) + T (−2P + T + r(P +R− T )))
(1− r)(P − S) + r(T −R)
u = −sr
β =
α((1− r)(T − P ) + r(R− S))
(1− r)(P − S) + r(T −R)
γ =
α(S − T )((−1 + r)2P + r(1− r)(T + S) + r2R)
(1− r)(P − S) + r(T −R)
∀v, α.
(34)
Because there exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ such that Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) are satisfied, p1 =
p2 = p3 = p4 = r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) enforces a linear payoff relationship. This strategy set is called unconditional
strategies [14]. By transforming α, β, γ into α = φs′, β = −φ, γ = φ(1− s′)l in Eq. (34), we obtain the following
equations, which are the same as Eq. (16) of [14]:
l = (1− r)2P + r(1− r)(T + S) + r2R
s′ = − (1− r)(P − S) + r(T −R)
(1− r)(T − P ) + r(R− S)
φ = (1− r)(T − P ) + r(R− S).
(35)
Appendix B Strategies that enforce sX = sY without errors
We prove that strategies specified by p1 = 1, p4 = 0 and p2 + p3 = 1 including TFT enforce a linear payoff
relationship with sX = sY under no errors. Equation (19) can be rewritten as follows by transforming α, β, γ
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into α = φs′, β = −φ, γ = φ(1− s′)l where s′ is the slope of the straight line:
p1 = 1− φ(1− s′)(R− l)
p2 = 1− φ[s′(l − S) + (T − l)]
p3 = φ[(l − S) + s′(T − l)]
p4 = φ(1− s′)(l − P ),
(36)
which corresponds to Eq. (16) of [14]. When s′ = 1, we obtain
p1 = 1
p2 + p3 = 1
p4 = 0.
(37)
This gives (α, β, γ) = (φ,−φ, 0), hence, we obtain sX = sY . Thus, strategies specified by p1 = 1, p4 = 0 and
p2 + p3 = 1 enforce a linear payoff relationship with sX = sY .
Appendix C Detailed calculations with errors
We substitute the column vectors of the determinant of Eq. (15) into Eq. (17) to obtain
s

τp1q1 + p1q2 + p2q1 + ξp2q2 − 1
p1q3 + ξp1q4 + τp2q3 + p2q4
p3q1 + τp3q2 + ξp4q1 + p4q2
ξp3q3 + p3q4 + p4q3 + τp4q4
+ t

µp1 + ηp2 − 1
ηp1 + µp2 − 1
µp3 + ηp4
ηp3 + µp4

+u

µq1 + ηq2 − 1
µq3 + ηq4
ηq1 + µq2 − 1
ηq3 + µq4
+ v

αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0.
(38)
By taking out q in Eq. (38), we obtain
(s(τp1 + p2) + uµ)q1 + (s(p1 + ξp2) + uη)q2
(s(p1 + τp2) + uµ)q3 + (s(ξp1 + p2) + uη)q4
(s(p3 + ξp4) + uη)q1 + (s(τp3 + p4) + uµ)q2
(s(ξp3 + p4) + uη)q3 + (s(p3 + τp4) + uµ)q4
+ t

µp1 + ηp2 − 1
ηp1 + µp2 − 1
µp3 + ηp4
ηp3 + µp4

+

−s− u
0
−u
0
+ v

αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0.
(39)
Here, we search for strategies which satisfy D(p, q, αSX +βSY +γ1) = 0 irrespective of Y ’s strategy q, meaning
that Eq. (39) must hold true irrespective of q. Therefore, the coefficients of each element q in Eq. (39) must
equal to zero, that is, the following conditions are necessary:
s(p1 + ξp2) + uη = 0
s(p3 + ξp4) + uη = 0
s(τp1 + p2) + uµ = 0
s(τp3 + p4) + uµ = 0
s(p1 + τp2) + uµ = 0
s(ξp1 + p2) + uη = 0
s(ξp3 + p4) + uη = 0
s(p3 + τp4) + uµ = 0
(40)
When Eq. (40) holds, the first terms of Eq. (39) are eliminated and we obtain
t

µp1 + ηp2 − 1
ηp1 + µp2 − 1
µp3 + ηp4
ηp3 + µp4
+

−s− u
0
−u
0
+ v

αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0. (41)
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If there exist real numbers, s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ such that Eq. (40) and Eq. (41) are satisfied simultaneously,
D(p, q, αSX + βSY + γ1) = 0 holds irrespective of q. To solve Eq. (40), we subtract the sixth equation from
the first, the seventh from the second, the fifth from the third, and the eighth from the fourth in Eq. (40) to
obtain: 
s(− ξ)(p1 − p2) = 0
s(− ξ)(p3 − p4) = 0
s(1− 3− ξ)(p1 − p2) = 0
s(1− 3− ξ)(p3 − p4) = 0
s(p1 + τp2) + uµ = 0
s(ξp1 + p2) + uη = 0
s(ξp3 + p4) + uη = 0
s(p3 + τp4) + uµ = 0.
(42)
First, we solve the first four equations and obtain (1) s = 0, (2)  − ξ = 0 and 1 − 3 − ξ = 0, (3) p1 − p2 = 0
and p3 − p4 = 0. We further analyze whether these equations satisfy the last four equations and Eq. (41) by
dividing into three cases as follows.
Case (1) s = 0:
In this case, we substitute s = 0 into Eq. (42) to obtain{
uη = 0
uµ = 0,
(43)
where µ = 1 −  − ξ and η =  + ξ. The equations µ = 0 and η = 0 do not hold at the same time. Therefore
one of the solutions of Eq. (42) is s = 0 and u = 0. Next, we check whether this solution satisfies Eq. (41). We
substitute s = 0 and u = 0 into Eq. (41) to obtain
t

µp1 + ηp2 − 1
ηp1 + µp2 − 1
µp3 + ηp4
ηp3 + µp4
+ v

αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0. (44)
Here, when we set t = 0, either equation
v = 0 (45)
or 
αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0 (46)
must hold. When we set v = 0, we obtain the trivial solution (s, t, u, v) = (0, 0, 0, 0). Also, we solve Eq. (46) and
obtain the trivial solution (α, β, γ) = (0, 0, 0). Hence, we do not have to consider the case of t = 0. Therefore,
in the following, we only consider t 6= 0. Replacing constants −αv/t, −βv/t, and −γv/t with α, β, and γ, we
obtain,
µp1 + ηp2 − 1 = αRE + βRE + γ
ηp1 + µp2 − 1 = αSE + βTE + γ
µp3 + ηp4 = αTE + βSE + γ
ηp3 + µp4 = αPE + βPE + γ.
(47)
If there exist α, β, and γ satisfying Eq. (47), there must be solutions that Eq. (17) hold. This solution is ZD
strategies with errors. This is consistent with Hao et al.’s [49].
Case (2) − ξ = 0 and 1− 3− ξ = 0:
In this case, the equations − ξ = 0 and 1−3− ξ = 0 lead to  = 1/4 and ξ = 1/4. When  = 1/4 and ξ = 1/4,
the expected payoffs RE = 1/2(R+ S), SE = 1/2(R+ S), TE = 1/2(T + P ), and PE = 1/2(T + P ) hold, which
do not satisfy the condition of the prisoner’s dilemma game: TE > RE > PE > SE . Hence, we can exclude this
solution.
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Case (3) p1 − p2 = 0 and p3 − p4 = 0:
In this case, we substitute p1 − p2 = 0 and p3 − p4 = 0 into Eq. (42) to obtain
µ(sp1 + u) = 0
η(sp1 + u) = 0
η(sp3 + u) = 0
µ(sp3 + u) = 0.
(48)
The equations µ = 0 and η = 0 do not hold at the same time. The following equations must hold.{
sp1 + u = 0
sp3 + u = 0.
(49)
Therefore, we obtain the solution p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = −u/s, which is the other solution of Eq. (42). Let r (0 ≤
r ≤ 1) be −u/s. Next, we check whether this solution satisfies Eq. (41). We substitute p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = r
and u = −sr into Eq. (41) to obtain
t

r − 1
r − 1
r
r
+ s

r − 1
0
r
0
+ v

αRE + βRE + γ
αSE + βTE + γ
αTE + βSE + γ
αPE + βPE + γ
 = 0. (50)
There exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β, and γ which satisfies Eq. (50) as follows:
s =
vα(SE(−PE −RE + SE) + TE(PE +RE − TE))
(1− r)(PE − SE) + r(TE −RE)
t =
vα(SE(2PE − SE + r(−PE −RE + SE)) + TE(−2PE + TE + r(PE +RE − TE)))
(1− r)(PE − SE) + r(TE −RE)
u = −sr
β =
α((1− r)(TE − PE) + r(RE − SE))
(1− r)(PE − SE) + r(TE −RE)
γ =
α(SE − TE)((−1 + r)2PE + r(1− r)(TE + SE) + r2RE)
(1− r)(PE − SE) + r(TE −RE)
∀v, α.
(51)
This strategy set is unconditional strategies p = (r, r, r, r), 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Therefore, the unconditional strategies
enforce a linear payoff relationship in the RPD game with errors because there exist real numbers s, t, u, v, α, β,
and γ such that Eq. (40) and Eq. (41) are satisfied.
Appendix D The feasible payoff-range for unconditional strategies
In this section, we show the feasible expected payoff-range when a player takes unconditional strategies. We
assume that player X takes unconditional strategies, which is p = (r, r, r, r). By substituting unconditional
strategies p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = r into Eq. (11), we obtain
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
τrq1 + rq2 + rq1 + ξrq2 − 1 µr + ηr − 1 µq1 + ηq2 − 1 f1
rq3 + ξrq4 + τrq3 + rq4 ηr + µr − 1 µq3 + ηq4 f2
rq1 + τrq2 + ξrq1 + rq2 µr + ηr ηq1 + µq2 − 1 f3
ξrq3 + rq4 + rq3 + τrq4 ηr + µr ηq3 + µq4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (52)
The equations τ = 1− 2− ξ, µ = 1− − ξ and η = + ξ, µ+ η = 1 lead to
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
r(µq1 + ηq2)− 1 r − 1 µq1 + ηq2 − 1 f1
r(µq3 + ηq4) r − 1 µq3 + ηq4 f2
r(ηq1 + µq2) r ηq1 + µq2 − 1 f3
r(ηq3 + µq4) r ηq3 + µq4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (53)
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By subtracting r times the third column from the first, we obtain
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
r − 1 r − 1 µq1 + ηq2 − 1 f1
0 r − 1 µq3 + ηq4 f2
r r ηq1 + µq2 − 1 f3
0 r ηq3 + µq4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (54)
By subtracting the third row from the first and the fourth from the second, we obtain
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 −1 (µ− η)(q1 − q2) f1 − f3
0 −1 (µ− η)(q3 − q4) f2 − f4
r r ηq1 + µq2 − 1 f3
0 r ηq3 + µq4 f4
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (55)
By subtracting r times the first row from the third and the fourth from r times the second, we obtain
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 −1 (µ− η)(q1 − q2) f1 − f3
0 −1 (µ− η)(q3 − q4) f2 − f4
0 0 ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) f3 + r(f1 − f3)
0 0 ηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) f4 + r(f2 − f4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (56)
The Laplace expansion along the first column yields:
D(p, q,f) = −
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 (µ− η)(q3 − q4) f2 − f4
0 ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) f3 + r(f1 − f3)
0 ηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) f4 + r(f2 − f4)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (57)
Additionally, the Laplace expansion along the first column yields:
D(p, q,f) =
∣∣∣∣ ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) r(f1 − f3) + f3ηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) r(f2 − f4) + f4
∣∣∣∣ . (58)
Therefore X’s expected payoff can be calculated by the form of the determinant as follows:
sX =
v · SX
v · 1 =
D(p, q,SX)
D(p, q,1)
=
∣∣∣∣ ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) r(RE − TE) + TEηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) r(SE − PE) + PE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) 1ηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) 1
∣∣∣∣ .
(59)
Let x be ηq1 + µq2 − 1 + r(µ− η)(q1 − q2) and y be ηq3 + µq4 + r(µ− η)(q3 − q4) to obtain
sX =
∣∣∣∣ x r(RE − TE) + TEy r(SE − PE) + PE
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ x 1y 1
∣∣∣∣ =
x{r(SE − PE) + PE} − y{r(RE − TE) + TE}
x− y , (60)
where −1 ≤ x ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 because 0 ≤ q1, q2, q3, q4 ≤ 1. In the case of x 6= 0, let k be y/x, where
−∞ < k ≤ 0 (∵ −1 ≤ x < 0 and 0 ≤ y ≤ 1). Then, Eq. (60) leads to
sX =
{r(SE − PE) + PE} − k{r(RE − TE) + TE}
1− k
=
{r(SE − PE) + PE} − {r(RE − TE) + TE}+ (1− k){r(RE − TE) + TE}
1− k
= r(RE − TE) + TE +
[{r(SE − PE) + PE} − {r(RE − TE) + TE}] 1
1− k
= r(RE − TE) + TE − {r(RE − SE) + (1− r)(TE − PE)} 1
1− k . (61)
Here, by the conditions 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and TE > RE > PE > SE , the sX is maximum if the function f(k) = 1/(1−k)
is minimum and the sX is minimum if the function f(k) is maximum. Then, the maximum of f(k) is f(0) = 1
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and the minimum do not exist but limk→−∞ f(k) ≈ 0. Hence, the range of sX in the case of x 6= 0 is
r(SE − PE) + PE ≤ sX < r(RE − TE) + TE . Next, in the case of x = 0, sX = r(RE − TE) + TE holds. From
the above, the feasible expected payoff-range for unconditional strategies is given by
r(SE − PE) + PE ≤ sX ≤ r(RE − TE) + TE . (62)
For instance, when (T,R, P, S) = (1.5, 1, 0,−0.5) is given, the expected payoffs become RE = 1 − 1.5( +
ξ), SE = −0.5 + 1.5(+ ξ), TE = 1.5(1− − ξ), and PE = 1.5(+ ξ), respectively. If player X is ALLD (r = 0),
his expected payoff becomes 1.5( + ξ) ≤ sX ≤ 1.5(1 −  − ξ) by Eq. (62). Thus, when  + ξ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, and
0.3, the ranges become 0 ≤ sX ≤ 1.5, 0.15 ≤ sX ≤ 1.35, 0.3 ≤ sX ≤ 1.2, and 0.45 ≤ sX ≤ 1.05, respectively.
Moreover, we can even know the possible payoff range for sY when player X takes p = (r, r, r, r) by replacing
SX with SY in Eq. (59).
Appendix E TFT can enforce a linear payoff relationship under er-
rors only when special conditions are satisfied
In general, with errors, TFT can enforce a linear payoff relationship only when special conditions are satisfied.
We prove it in this section.
As we showed in the main text, the only strategies that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either ZD
or unconditional strategies with observation errors. Thus, TFT must be included in one of them. It is obvious
that TFT is not classified as an unconditional strategy because it is specified by p = (1, 0, 1, 0). Therefore, we
check whether TFT can be classified as ZD strategies. If there exist strategies that satisfy Eq. (22), TFT is one
of the ZD strategies.
By substituting p = (1, 0, 1, 0) into Eq. (22), we obtain
µ− 1 = αRE + βRE + γ
η − 1 = αSE + βTE + γ
µ = αTE + βSE + γ
η = αPE + βPE + γ.
(63)
We solve this equation and obtain the following two types of the solution:
η = 0
α =
−1
SE − TE
β =
1
SE − TE
γ = 0,
(64)
or
RE + PE = TE + SE
α =
2(η − 1)PE + (1− 2η)TE + SE
(2PE − SE − TE)(SE − TE)
β =
2(1− η)PE + (2η − 1)SE − TE
(2PE − SE − TE)(SE − TE)
γ = − η(SE + TE)
2PE − SE − TE ,
(65)
which means that only in the case that there are no errors (η = 0⇔  = 0, ξ = 0) as already proven in Appendix
B or the case with RE +PE = TE +SE , TFT can enforce a linear payoff relationship. Figure E.1 shows the case
with RE +PE 6= TE +SE . When there are no errors (black dots), TFT can enforce a linear payoff relationship.
However, in the other cases (green and light green dots), the linear relationship collapses.
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Figure E.1: The payoff relationships between two players in the RPD game with errors. Payoff vector:
(T,R, P, S) = (2, 1, 0,−0.5). TFT strategy vs. 1000 + 2 strategies. In this case, ξ = 0 is fixed and  is
varied to 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3.
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